

# The Linkage between WMD Non-Proliferation and the Level of State Development in East Asia

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## I. Introduction

How states in East Asia—Northeast and Southeast Asia—respond to the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD)—nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons—and their delivery systems<sup>(1)</sup> will influence profoundly the shape of international security in the coming decades. East Asia may well develop into a world hub of WMD proliferation. Many countries in this region are major transshipment and assembly points for critical strategic dual-use components and technologies. As Table 1 shows, seven of the top ten world ‘mega-ports’ are located in East Asia. Some East Asian countries are already major acquirers and/or suppliers of WMD-related items. For example, the Central Intelligence Agency nominates the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK or North Korea) as one of the world’s major acquirers of WMD and name China, North Korea, and Russia as key WMD suppliers (Director of Central Intelligence, 2003). In short, WMD proliferation is proceeding much more rapidly and extensively in East Asia than any other part of the world.

In addition, East Asia is an area where international relations are often troubled by unresolved territorial disputes and historical animosities. The proliferation of WMD and ballistic missile capabilities may well exacerbate arms race tendencies in the region by creating incentives to counter perceived threats either through deterrence (i.e. the development of similar capabilities) or defense (i.e. the development of counter-capabilities). Japan once made clear that Tokyo would launch a pre-emptive strike on North Korea as a self-defense

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**Table 1. World Mega-Ports**

<b>1. Hong Kong</b>	<b>6. Pusan</b>
<b>2. Shanghai</b>	7. Bremerhaven
<b>3. Singapore</b>	<b>8. Tokyo</b>
<b>4. Kaohsiung</b>	9. Genoa
5. Rotterdam	<b>10. Yantian</b>

Letters in bold indicate ports in East Asia.

Source: U.S. Department of State. "Fact Sheet: U.S. Works on Container Security in Foreign Ports." *Washington File*. 2003.

<<http://usinfo.org/wf-archive/2003/030313/epf408.htm>>.

measure if there were evidence that Pyongyang was fuelling missiles for an attack. If the DPRK possessed nuclear weapons capability, not only Japan but also South Korea and Taiwan may come under pressure to develop their own nuclear deterrent capability, leading to nuclearization of Northeast Asia. This will incur an unbearable damage on global non-proliferation community.

The proliferation of WMD is a global security issue. Countries of concern continue to pursue WMD programs by purchasing WMD-related goods and technologies. Of increasing alarm is the possibility that WMD-related items can fall into the hands of terrorist organizations such as al-Qaeda that are seeking to inflict mass casualties. Unless countries can effectively regulate transfers of such materials and technologies, they become breeding grounds for WMD terrorism. Although it is a global problem, this article emphasizes region-wide non-proliferation efforts. But, this is to suggest neither that a regional approach is better than a global one nor that the former should take the central role. The article only assumes that that WMD proliferation is a world-wide issue does not mean that it has to be addressed only at the global level; regional cooperation can also play an important role in preventing the proliferation of WMD.

Still, regionalism has two notable advantages over globalism. First, because countries are more familiar with and knowledgeable about their neighboring partners than those of the opposite end of the globe, they can devise modes

of proliferation management (e.g. verification and safeguards systems) specifically adapted to the conditions and requirements of the region, reflecting particularities and preferences of regional countries. For example, one of the important characteristics of regional cooperation in East Asia is that the countries prefer informal processes and institutional arrangements to formal structures. They also prefer consultation and consensus decision-making. Cooperation based on such regional features may prove more practical than the one that is regardless of them. Given the regional differences and the various causes of proliferation, it would indeed be surprising if a global approach was successful in dealing with all regions. Second, some countries remain outside international non-proliferation treaties and regimes. The DPRK is not a party to the Chemical Weapons Convention and, though agreed to return, announced to withdraw from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). By addressing the complexities of the regional security environment, regional non-proliferation efforts can supplement efforts made at the global level.

While there are a number of measures to curb WMD proliferation, this article gives emphasis on export controls because, though the rationales for WMD acquisition vary from state to state, the WMD programs of non-Permanent Five states, such as North Korea, Iran, Libya, India and Pakistan, share two characteristics: (1) most rely heavily on foreign military and dual-use items and (2) most use legitimate commercial channels as cover for illicit transfers (Cupitt et al., 2001, p.70). These characteristics suggest that export controls on the transfer of WMD-related items can play a critical role in stemming WMD proliferation.

This article makes two related arguments. First, while the (neo)realist-neoliberal line of argument may explain the non-proliferation incentive of developed countries, it does poorly in the case of developing countries in East Asia. An explanation based on the level of state development offers a more convincing account. The level of state development approach suggests that state preferences differ in accordance with the level of state development a state is in. The central objective of the government in developing countries is

modernization or state development.<sup>(2)</sup> The willingness of developing countries to strengthen WMD non-proliferation efforts is thus influenced by how such effort affects the process of state development. The second argument of this article is thus the following: In East Asia where developing countries outnumber developed countries, the main driving force of overall regional non-proliferation cooperation is the common interest in modernization.

To advance the first argument, it is first necessary to elaborate on how (neo)realism and neoliberalism, the two principal theoretical approaches in International Relations, explain the emergence of inter-state cooperation against the proliferation of WMD. This is the subject of the first section. This section highlights that despite differences in their emphases, the two schools of thought show a notable commonality on the driving force of WMD non-proliferation cooperation. After challenging the (neo)realist-neoliberal position by indicating discrepancies between the expected and actual state actions, the next section offers an alternative explanation based on the level of state development. It illustrates differences in non-proliferation efforts between developed and developing countries, and contends that such differences originate in the divergence in the level of state development among East Asian states. Finally, the last section briefly reflects on the findings of this article.

## **II. Why States Cooperate on WMD Non-Proliferation? The (Neo) Realist–Neoliberal Approach**

As to why states cooperate on preventing the proliferation of WMD, (neo) realism offers an explanation. The (neo) realists argue that in an anarchical international system where a central governing authority is non-existent, states are preoccupied with augmenting their military and economic power in order to ensure survival. Neglect of this business of enhancing state power will endanger their survival because states constantly look for opportunities to take advantage of others. States are thus in a competitive, self-help international system wherein they can rely only on themselves in achieving national security and maintaining survival. States are also compelled to balance the power of others. Because

states operate in the constant struggle to survive, they are necessarily concerned about the relative gains of others. In such an environment under anarchy, states attempt to maintain security essentially in two ways. They either seek to augment power through self-help or choose to form an alliance with others. The latter option is especially useful against a common external threat. Alliances are most commonly considered as a response to an external threat, whose primary purpose is to combine the capabilities of the members to further their interests (Walt, 1997, pp.157-8).

Cooperation to curb WMD proliferation can be understood as a form of alliance. According to the realist/neorealist perspective, states develop compatible export control systems as a prudent response to the emergence of a common threat to national security. States in the same region, moreover, can readily form a regional alliance if the menace—i.e. WMD proliferation—is regarded as a threat to regional security. We should also expect to see a greater commitment to WMD non-proliferation in those states that are seeking to balance the power of a particular (group of) state(s) or non-state actor(s) by controlling the flow of WMD-related components to them. Furthermore, export controls will be more developed in those states that perceive such effort as enhancing their security relative to others, especially to certain target states/actors whom they wish to balance against (Grillot, 1998, pp.3-5).

Neoliberalism, a competing approach to (neo)realism, also provides a convincing explanation. Although the neoliberal approach emphasizes a different aspect of international relations from that of (neo) realism, it suggests a similar account. With the assumption that states rationally calculate the material costs and benefits, the neoliberals argue that the proliferation of WMD is a common security challenge that threatens the security of all states. While the extent of threat to which WMD proliferation poses to security differs from region to region (e.g., it is given a low profile in the security agenda of the Pacific Island states) and from state to state (e.g., North Korea's nuclear program poses a greater threat to Japan than to, say, Brunei), it is a transnational security issue. Proliferators of WMD-related materials cannot be determined in an *a priori* manner, especially

if they are non-state actors. In an age of increasingly complex interdependence and globalization, WMD materials and technologies can be transferred through normal trade channels. Recent revelations of the involvement of Malaysian-based entities in the Abdul Qadeer Khan nuclear smuggling network, which exposed that a rogue trading network linked to nuclear black market was located and operated in Malaysia, illustrates the ubiquitous and unpredictable nature of WMD proliferation. The emergence of such a common security issue facilitates inter-state cooperation. Because no state alone can effectively manage, let alone solve, such a transnational security challenge, it is in the interest of all states to cope with it through cooperation. Inter-state cooperation thus becomes a shared interest among states.

The existence of common interests promotes states to maximize their absolute gains. The existence of common security problems also creates a positive-sum situation, thereby eliminating, or at least markedly ameliorating, relative gains concerns. Since world politics is operated in a competitive, self-help environment, relative gains considerations are regarded as one of the two primary obstacles to inter-state cooperation (Mearsheimer, 1994/95, pp.5-49). However, because resolving or managing common security problems such as WMD proliferation is an interest to all and benefits every one roughly equally, states will seek to maximize absolute as opposed to relative gains. For example, the decreased likelihood of international terrorists like al Qaeda-linked Jemaah Islamiyah's acquiring WMD capabilities is a gain for all the states in East Asia. The neoliberals also argue that states with common interests (e.g. tackling WMD proliferation) create international institutions or regimes (e.g. the NPT) to reduce transaction costs and uncertainty in their future interactions (Grillot, 1998, pp.5-6).

While the two theoretical approaches emphasize contrasting aspects of international relations, on the issue of WMD non-proliferation they coincide on the view that the states' recognition that WMD proliferation constitutes a common threat to security is the main driver for non-proliferation effort. According to these theoretical approaches, we should expect that states in East

Asia are making strenuous efforts roughly equally to prevent the proliferation of WMD because a fledgling export control system of even one country could undermine non-proliferation efforts made elsewhere in the region.

As these theoretical schools of thought suggest, the realization that the proliferation of WMD constitutes a common threat to security is permeating in the region. In July 2004, leaders of the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), the only multilateral institution focusing on regional security issues, released a joint statement, *ARF Statement on Non-Proliferation*, pledging to strengthen cooperation on WMD non-proliferation. Noting that the proliferation of WMD increases the risk that terrorists gain access to WMD, the members stressed the importance of a multilateral approach to non-proliferation and arms control (*ASEAN Regional Forum Statement on Non-Proliferation*, 2004). The joint statement also urged ARF members to “redouble” non-proliferation efforts, including reinforcement of national export controls, information sharing, cooperation on preventing illicit trafficking of items related to WMD, and the strengthening of legal frameworks for criminalizing the export of equipment and technology that could lead to WMD proliferation (*ASEAN Regional Forum Statement on Non-Proliferation*, 2004).

As issues of trade, security, and non-proliferation are intertwined, Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) also addresses the issue of WMD proliferation. Based on the 2003 *Bangkok Declaration on Partnership for the Future* to introduce and adopt strict export control regulations, APEC leaders adopted *APEC Key Elements for Effective Export Control Systems*, a joint proposal of Japan and the United States, at the meeting in November 2004 in Santiago, Chile. Agreeing to work together to strengthen export control capacities of the APEC members, leaders highlighted four elements for effective export control: legal and regulatory framework, licensing procedures and practice, enforcement, and industry outreach (*APEC Key Elements for Effective Export Control Systems*, 2004). Moreover, the APEC members established guidelines on the control of Man-Portable Air Defense Systems exports, which could be used by terrorists to attack civilian aviation (*Joint Statement of the Sixteenth APEC*

*Ministerial Meeting, 2004).*

However, a glance at the participation record of East Asian countries in international non-proliferation treaties and regimes<sup>(3)</sup> (see Tables 2 and 3) indicates that the (neo)realist-neoliberal line of argument does not explain well the dynamics of overall non-proliferation efforts in the region. Their participation is at variance with the (neo)realist-neoliberal anticipation of state performance that states, based on the shared recognition that WMD proliferation is a common threat to security, would be making roughly equally efforts to curb such proliferation. In contrast, Tables 2 and 3 show that WMD non-proliferation efforts vary from state to state. For example, while Japan and South Korea are members of all of the relevant arrangements, the participation of other countries is spotty, especially that of Southeast Asian states. None of the ASEAN states is a party to key export control regimes such as the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) and the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG). Therefore, the shared threat perception is not a primary driver in this region. What, then, is the main driving force? This article posits that it is states' common interest in modernization.

### **III. WMD Non-Proliferation and State Development**

#### **1. The Level of State Development**

East Asia is a region where developed and developing states co-exist. Even though the proliferation of WMD equally threatens the security of both developed and developing countries, how does the divergence in the level of state development affect WMD non-proliferation efforts?

In accordance with the level of state development a state is in, it is natural that the goals and preferences of states differ. And, the divergence in state preferences naturally generates differences in their attitudes toward WMD non-proliferation. We begin with developing countries since they predominate in East Asia. Developing countries are considered as those states that have achieved a



**Table 2. Selected International Treaties**

Country	BWC	CWC	NPT	IAEA SA	IAEA AP
China	x	x	x	x	x
Japan	x	x	x	x	x
ROK	x	x	x	x	x
DPRK	x		(x) <sup>1</sup>	(x) <sup>2</sup>	
Brunei	x	x	x	x	(x) <sup>3</sup>
Cambodia	x		x	x	
Indonesia	x	x	x	x	x
Laos	x	x	x	x	
Malaysia	x	x	x	x	
Myanmar			x	x	
Philippines	x	x	x	x	x
Singapore	x	x	x	x	
Thailand	x	x	x	x	(x) <sup>3</sup>
Vietnam	x	x	x	x	(x) <sup>3</sup>

Sources: Reports submitted to the 1540 Committee of the UN Security Council. Available from <http://disarmament2.un.org/Committee1540/report.html>; Monterey Institute of International Studies, "Inventory of International Nonproliferation Organizations and Regimes." <http://cns.miis.edu/pubs/inven/index.htm>; *Asian Export Control Observer* (various issues).

Note: <sup>1</sup> Announced to withdraw in January 2003, but agreed to return in September 2005.

<sup>2</sup> The IAEA's ability to monitor nuclear activities was completely lost in December 2002 when North Korea expelled IAEA inspectors.

<sup>3</sup> Notified its intent to sign.

International Treaties:

BWC: Biological Weapons Convention (1972)

CWC: Chemical Weapons Convention (1993)

NPT: Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (1968)

IAEA SA: IAEA Safeguards Agreement (1957)

IAEA AP: IAEA Additional Protocol (1997)

certain level of political stability, but not yet reached maturity (Tanaka, 1996, p.201). Developing countries are thus still in the midst of state-building. For developing countries, accordingly, the central agenda is state development or the strengthening of the state through modernization (Fukuyama, 2004, pp.100-1). In economic terms, we should expect that developing countries are cooperative

**Table 3. Selected Global Export Control Regimes**

Country	AG	MTCR	NSG	WA	HCOC
China		(x) <sup>1</sup>	x		
Japan	x	x	x	x	x
ROK	x	x	x	x	x
DPRK					
Brunei					
Cambodia					
Indonesia					
Laos					
Malaysia					
Myanmar					
Philippines					x
Singapore					
Thailand					
Vietnam					

Sources: Reports submitted to the UN Security Council Committee 1540.

Available from <http://disarmament2.un.org/Committee1540/report.html>;

Monterey Institute of International Studies, "Inventory of International Nonproliferation Organizations and Regimes." Available from <http://cns.miiis.edu/pubs/inven/index.htm>.

Note: <sup>1</sup> Applied to membership in 2003 and its bid is under discussion.

Global Export Control Regimes:

AG: Australia Group (1985)

MTCR: Missile Technology Control Regime (1987)

NSG: Nuclear Suppliers Group (1975)

WA: Wassenaar Arrangement (1996)

HCOC: Hague Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation (2002)

to WMD non-proliferation when such effort is fruitful to economic prosperity and, conversely, they are averse to such effort if it is viewed as detrimental to economic growth.

It should be noted that the linkage between WMD non-proliferation and economic development is not novel; it has been one of the features that characterized the debate of nuclear non-proliferation during the Cold War, especially in the 1960s and the 1970s (Naya, 2000, pp.11-15; Subrahmanyam, 1992, pp.135-44). It was one of the North-South controversies. Developing

countries criticized that the NPT is a manifestation of inequality in which developed countries controlled and limited the flow of advanced technology to developing countries, slowing the process of modernization of the latter. However, as Masatsugu Naya points out, one of the important reasons behind the progress in WMD non-proliferation effort in the post-Cold War period is the adaptation of developing countries to the economically deeply interdependent international community (Naya, 2000, p.17). In such an international community, developing countries have come to increasingly recognize that the possession of WMD does not carry much weight in pursuing their national interests (Naya, 2000, p.17). Given this point addressed by Naya, therefore, it is important to reiterate the linkage between WMD non-proliferation and economic development.

Modernization also involves political development. Political development is the growth in the capacity of states (governments) to govern and to organize for political action (Hagopian, 2000, p.902). Understood as such, political development requires internal and external legitimacy; that is, the government in power is supported by most, if not all, of its populace and regarded as morally right, and its state sovereignty and territorial integrity are recognized internationally. Developing countries, as a result, place special importance on norms of sovereignty and domestic non-interference and domestic political legitimacy. In relation to WMD non-proliferation efforts, we should anticipate that developing countries are supportive of non-proliferation if such effort strengthens domestic political legitimacy. They would also be cooperative if it does not impinge on state sovereignty or interfere in their domestic issues.

Developed countries, on the other hand, are more cooperative to prevention of WMD proliferation for two reasons. First, developed countries are those that are matured politically and economically. Politically matured means that institutional capacity—the ability to formulate and carry out policies—is well developed. This suggests that developed countries can perform well in export controls. Second, developed countries may be more closely tied to the threat of WMD proliferation because prosperous countries are generally more likely

to produce, consume, or re-export items of proliferation concern (Cupitt et al., 2001, p.71). Moreover, developed states may regard the proliferation of WMD as more threatening to their national security than developing countries, due to their high level of economic and security interdependence. A high degree of interdependence can serve as a transmission belt for spreading security problems throughout the region as well as the world. Hence, developed states are concerned about each other. This is even the case between geographically distant countries such as Germany and Japan, as they are bound together by extremely well-developed transportation and communications networks (Tanaka, 1996, p.197). Given their intensive political, economic, and social interactions across societies, developed states face an increased threat of proliferation. In East Asia, generally speaking, in addition to Japan, Singapore and South Korea can be considered as developed states. China and other ASEAN states are classified as developing countries.

## **2. Developed Countries**

Three developed countries in East Asia—Japan, South Korea, and Singapore—are keen on WMD non-proliferation and tend to participate more actively in such effort than other regional countries. As already stated, Japan and South Korea are members of all the cardinal international non-proliferation treaties and regimes. Singapore, on the other hand, does not participate in any global export control regimes (see Tables 2 and 3). Nevertheless, Singapore has developed national export control systems that are consistent with key export control regimes such as the Australia Group, the NSG, the MTCR, and the Wassenaar Arrangement (Yuan, 2004b, p.15). Singapore probably has the most comprehensive export control systems in Southeast Asia (Asian Export Control Observer, December 2004/January 2005, p.9). Also, Singapore is actively cooperating with other countries in the pursuit of WMD non-proliferation.

Only two East Asian states —Japan and Singapore— participate in the American-led Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), which is designed to stop the spread of WMD by intercepting suspect shipments from flowing to and

from states or non-state actors of proliferation concern. Japan hosted the twelfth PSI interdiction exercise in Sagami Bay in October 2004, whereas Singapore hosted the eighteenth in the South China Sea in August 2005. While South Korea remains outside of the Initiative for fear of provoking North Korea, Seoul expressed cautious support for the PSI.

Japan plays a key leadership role in regional non-proliferation efforts. Japan's efforts were initially driven by its fear of North Korea acquiring WMD capabilities, but Japan is now active enough to seek to construct an Asian export control community, a regional network centering on Japan (Hosokawa, 2003, pp.43-44). Tokyo has organized the Asian Export Control Seminar (since 1993), the Asian Export Control Policy Dialogue (since 2003), and the Asian Senior-Level Talks on Non-Proliferation or ASTOP (since 2003). The central aim of these programs is enhancement of regional awareness of the importance of export controls and provision of relevant East Asian officials with professional and technical expertise. Also, as pledged in the 2003 *Tokyo Declaration for the Dynamic and Enduring Japan-ASEAN Partnership in the New Millennium* and the attendant *Japan-ASEAN Plan of Action*, Japanese Foreign Ministry representatives visited ten ASEAN countries in February 2004 to exchange views and strengthen non-proliferation cooperation (Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2004).

### **3. Developing Countries**

Because the primary task of developing countries is state development, they accord top priority to economic development. But, export controls can be an impediment to economic prosperity. In 1999, for example, the United States shifted controls on commercial satellite items from the Commerce Control List to the Munitions List, where items face more severe restrictions. In the subsequent twelve months, the value of U.S. commercial satellite exports declined from \$1.08 billion to \$637 million and the U.S. global market share dropped from 73 percent to 52 percent (Reinsch, 2000; Cupitt et al., 2001, p.70). U.S. Department of Commerce officials attribute most of this dramatic decline to

the changes in export controls (Reinsch, 2000; Cupitt et al., 2001, p.70).

As expected, many developing countries in East Asia have been reluctant to tighten export controls. China has been most outspoken about this matter by arguing that global non-proliferation regimes unreasonably limit legitimate right of developing states to economic development. For example, Beijing “strongly opposes the actions by the member states of the Australia Group in obstructing the normal chemical trade between State Parties to the [Chemical Weapons] Convention under the pretext of non-proliferation” (PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2002). While it has recently become more committed to non-proliferation, China still maintains this position. China’s first White Paper on non-proliferation entitled *China’s Non-Proliferation Policy and Measures* writes that it is important that all countries “strike a proper balance between non-proliferation and international cooperation for peaceful use of relevant high technologies” so as to “guarantee the rights of all countries, especially the developing nations, to utilize and share dual-use scientific and technological achievements and products” (Information Office of the State Council of the People’s Republic of China, 2003, Section I).

The aforementioned A.Q. Kahn nuclear smuggling network in Malaysia also provides an example in which the Malaysian government’s interests in economic development militated against non-proliferation. Malaysia has been seeking to develop the country as an international center for advanced engineering through the development of economic infrastructure and marketing. Abdul Razak Baginda, executive director of the Malaysian Strategic Research Center, argues that because the Malaysian government has been pushing hard to attract foreign investment to realize that goal, a business proposal put forward by Buhary Syed Abu Tahir, Kahn’s right-hand man, to manufacture advanced machine components for oil and gas industry was attractive to the government (Sipress, 2004, p.A12). As a result, local officials apparently did not press Tahir about the ultimate use of the exported centrifuge components (Sipress, 2004, p.A12).

Malaysia’s comprehensive report on national non-proliferation policies submitted to the 1540 Committee, which was established by the UN

Security Council Resolution 1540 on Non-Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction, confirms this point. Although Kuala Lumpur admits that it lacks a comprehensive WMD export control systems, and despite the existence of the Kahn nuclear network within the country, Malaysia neither alluded to any significant weaknesses in its system nor declared its intention to sign the Additional Protocol to its comprehensive safeguards agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) (Permanent Mission of Malaysia to the United Nations, 2004; *New Straits Times*, February 2004, p.2). And, the report stated that current “export control laws and regulations are mainly based on economic reasons” (Permanent Mission of Malaysia to the United Nations, 2004, p. 8). Similarly, Indonesia has long viewed export control regimes as barriers to economic development (*Asian Export Control Observer*, December 2004/January 2005, p.7). Because economic development is given one of the highest priorities, as Cupitt and others point out, it is often the case that officials in many developing countries “stress the primacy of economic prosperity in their national strategies, with few expressing any real concern that WMD proliferation poses much direct risk to their national security” (Cupitt et al., 2001, pp.71-72).

That interests in modernization are driving WMD non-proliferation effort is also illustrated by China’s recent improvement in non-proliferation efforts. China began improving its non-proliferation efforts in the 1990s. For instance, China had signed about 10 to 20 percent of all arms control treaties it was eligible to sign in 1970, but it acceded to 85 to 90 percent of such agreements by 1996 (Swaine and Johnston, 1999, p.101). Beijing signed the NPT in 1992; the Chemical Weapons Convention in 1993; the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty in 1996; and the Protocol Additional to the IAEA Safeguards Agreement in 1997. China became a member of Zangger Committee in 1997; joined the NSG in 2004; and is now seeking entry to MTCR (Monterey Institute of International Studies, 2004). Despite its critical views on WMD non-proliferation regimes, why has China acceded to these export control arrangements?

The answer is its interests in economic development. Beijing recognizes that its economic development depends to a significant degree on transfers of

advanced Western technology and foreign investment. The United States, one of the largest sources of foreign direct investment and high technology transfers to China, has played a particularly significant role in the improvement of Chinese non-proliferation efforts. Washington has either offered to allow Beijing greater access to U.S. technology or waived sanctions in return for China's pledges or actions to halt selling items of WMD proliferation concern. Negotiations of the 1985 *Sino-U.S. Peaceful Nuclear Cooperation Agreement*, deals estimated to have a value of U.S. 15 billion dollars through 2010, illustrate the impact of economic incentives (Hu, 1999, p.134). During his visit to the United States in October 1997, President Jiang Zemin was believed to give four pledges to President Clinton. First, China would not provide nuclear technology to unsafeguarded nuclear facilities in any country. Second, China was to strengthen nuclear export control regulations. Third, China responded favorably to the U.S. suggestion to join the Zangger Committee. Fourth, Beijing provided written assurances to Washington that it would not engage in nuclear cooperation with Iran. In return for these pledges and actions, Clinton certified to Congress that China was no longer engaging in any nuclear proliferation (Gill and Medeiros, 2000, pp.79-81; Yuan, 2004a, pp.156-7, 164-5). The Sino-U.S. Nuclear Cooperation Agreement went into effect in March 1998. In addition, Chinese CSCAP members see development of a better export control regime as a critical part of China's attempt to modernize its economy (Glosserman, 2003). It should be noted, however, that U.S. economic inducements produced mixed results: there are instances where U.S. offer of access to advanced technology has been declined by China. Nevertheless, what underlies Chinese behavior remains the same: economic interests. As Jing-dong Yuan observes, the mixed results of the American strategy are a "reflection of Beijing's assessment of its national interests after weighing expected rewards (Western technologies) against forsaken commercial opportunities (missile/nuclear transfers) (Yuan, 2004a, p.165).

The political aspect of state interests in modernization is well illustrated in the case of the DPRK. More specifically, in case of North Korea it is interests in state survival, rather than state development. As Tables 2 and 3 show, North



Korea is hardly cooperative to WMD non-proliferation. Pyongyang is believed to have reneged on the obligations of few of the treaties it is actually a state party of. It is the U.S. official view that North Korea has an active biological weapons program and may have weaponized biological weapons agents in violation of the Biological Weapons Convention. In December 2002, to cite the most recent example, North Korea removed all seals and IAEA monitoring equipment from Yongbyon nuclear facilities, moved one thousand fuel rods into the reactor, and expelled IAEA inspectors from the country. North Korea announced its withdrawal from the NPT in January 2003. The country is not only uncooperative, but in fact it is an active proliferant. North Korea is believed to have sold missiles and missile technology to Egypt, Iran, Libya, Pakistan, Syria, Vietnam and Yemen (Lintner and Stecklow, 2003, p.13).

While there are divisions over North Korea's nuclear intentions among analysts, it seems most likely that Pyongyang views nuclear weapons as a guarantor to its survival. Although developing nuclear forces is not cheap, today's rapid technological change constantly threatens the military value of conventional forces, and thus maintenance of that conventional military value will be far more expensive than nuclear investment (Goldstein, 2000, pp.54-55. Pyongyang would have to very quickly develop by itself or acquire from others state-of-the-art conventional forces such as precision-guided munitions, electronic countermeasures and stealth technology. It must also counter quantitative and qualitative improvements in the capabilities of the United States and South Korea. Given its economic difficulties and the already existing military imbalance between the North and the South, achieving and maintaining the level of military comparability with the United States and South Korea is simply impossible for North Korea. As Avery Goldstein contends, nuclear weapons "enable states to satisfy basic security requirements self-reliantly and relatively economically. They are not cheap but when married to deterrent doctrines nuclear weapons can dissuade even much more powerful adversaries without incurring the high costs of comparably effective conventional defenses" (Goldstein, 2000, p.225). Kim Yong Il, Vice Foreign Minister of the DPRK,

clearly stated in his keynote speech at the first round of the six-party talks that North Korea's nuclear deterrent force is "a means for self-defense to protect our sovereignty" ("Six-Party Talks on the North Korea Nuclear Crisis, Beijing, August 27-29," 2004). This is why the DPRK is so vehement not to give up its nuclear weapons program.

Moreover, Pyongyang's missile proliferation is driven primarily to earn hard currency in order to keep its economy from collapsing. In fact, missile sales are the chief means to acquire foreign currencies. Kim Dok Hong, a North Korean defector who ran a company involved in arms trade, states that the missile sales make up as much as forty percent of North Korea's exports (Lintner and Stecklow, 2003, p.13). It is no wonder why the DPRK is uncooperative to WMD non-proliferation.

#### **IV. Concluding Remarks**

This article has argued that the level of state development approach can better explain the dynamics of overall East Asian WMD non-proliferation efforts than the (neo)realist-neoliberal line of argument. Given the fact that a rudimentary export control system of even one country could compromise non-proliferation efforts made elsewhere in the region, how developing countries, whose non-proliferation performance falls behind that of developed countries, buttress their effort significantly influences the effectiveness of the overall regional non-proliferation cooperation. The level of state development approach suggests that to accelerate WMD non-proliferation endeavor, factors related to modernization can promote developing states' efforts. China is a case in point, in which American economic inducements played an important role in improving China's non-proliferation practice.

It is important that non-proliferation efforts are not viewed as obstacles to economic development. Developed countries must continue stressing the importance of non-proliferation, but at the same time should give greater credence to the value of assisting developing countries to prosper. The DPRK presents a more difficult, complicated case, since economic incentives alone

will not significantly change the attitude of the country. As is often argued, political incentives—i.e. a guarantee of its regime survival—are also requisite. While improvement in non-proliferation performance by developing countries is critical to prevent the proliferation of WMD, developed states can also play a crucial part in helping to facilitate developing countries' modernization as well as ameliorate their non-proliferation efforts.

## Notes

- (1) WMD and their delivery means will hereafter be referred to as WMD.
- (2) The terms 'modernization' and 'state development' will be used interchangeably in this article.
- (3) Though this article highlights regional cooperation, endorsement to international WMD non-proliferation treaties and regimes is also crucial because they provide important benchmarks for the development of such effort at the regional level.

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## 東アジアにおける大量破壊兵器不拡散と 国家発展段階の連関

### < 要 約 >

福田 保

東アジアには、大量破壊兵器生産に使われる機器や技術を含む軍事・汎用品の積み替え（トランスシッピングメント）地点となる世界の主要港が多く存在するため、当該地域は船舶を利用した物流の要衝となっている。また、北朝鮮や中国等を始め、WMD または WMD 関連製品を供与ないし獲得している国が既に存在している。よって、東アジア諸国の WMD 拡散防止への取り組みは、地域の安全だけでなく国際安全保障全体にも多大な影響を与える。

現実主義と新自由主義は、それぞれ国際関係の競争と協調といった正反対の側面を強調するが、国家を WMD 不拡散取り組みに駆り立てる主要因に関しては、共通点を見出している。それは、それぞれの論理は異なるものの、「WMD 拡散が国家安全保障に対する脅威である」という共通の認識である。実際に、東アジア諸国の取り組みと比較してみると、この現実主義及び新自由主義の視点は、先進国の不拡散取り組みを説明する上では有用であるかもしれないが、発展途上国の取り組みを十分に説明し得ない。つまり、東アジア全体の大量破壊兵器不拡散取り組みの力学を説明するには不十分である。東アジア諸国の国家発展段階に着目したアプローチは、当該地域の不拡散取り組みを説明する上でより適していると考えられる。

東アジアは、先進国と発展途上国が共存する地域であるが、発展途上国のほうがより多く存在している。発展途上国は、国家建設過程にある国であり、よって、発展途上国の最優先事項は近代化ないし国家発展である。その結果、発展途上諸国が大量破壊兵器不拡散取り組みにより積極的に関わるのは、近代化、つまり政治・経済発展に寄与すると判断された時である。反対に、そのような取り組みが国家発展を阻害すると判断された場合は、発展途上諸国は消極的な態度をとる。中国の、不拡散協力と発展途上国の経済発展の釣り合いを保つことが重要であるという主張は、発展途上国

にとっての近代化の重要性を示す好例である。大量破壊兵器不拡散への取り組みは、輸出規制が緩い国が一国でも存在すると、地域全体の取り組みをも害することになるため、東アジアにおける不拡散取り組みの有効性は発展途上諸国のそれに依拠していると言って良い。換言すれば、当該地域全体の不拡散取り組みの成否を左右する要因は、近代化・国家発展を遂行するという、発展途上国共通の利害であると言える。